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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STATE V. MCATEER: MUST EXTRAJURISDICTIONAL
ARREST AUTHORITY COME AT THE EXPENSE
OF POLITICAL AccOUNTABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
A citizen's arrest is characterized as follows: "A private citizen as
contrasted with a police officer may, under certain circumstances, make an
arrest, generally for a felony or misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the
peace."' Although this definition might suggest that a police officer is not a
private citizen, police officers acting outside their jurisdictions retain their
status as private citizens, so any arrests by such officers are citizens' arrests.2
In a recent South Carolina case, State v. McAteer,3 an off-duty police
officer arrested James McAteer for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
court found the arrest to be valid as a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor
involving a breach of the peace.' The pivotal points in McAteer are whether
South Carolina still authorizes citizens to arrest others for breaches of the peace
and whether driving under the influence of alcohol constitutes this type of a
breach.' But as significant as these issues are, the McAteer court declined to
comment upon one equally important aspect of the case-the officer who
arrested McAteer was still in uniform and asserting indicia of state power.6
Nonetheless, the court declined to categorize the officer's acts as anything more
than a citizen's arrest, even though the facts of McAteer do not fit the mold of
a typical citizen's arrest.
Part II of this Note summarizes the common law rules governing
citizens' arrests. Part III summarizes the facts and holding of McAteer. Part IV
articulates the advantages and disadvantages ofMcAteer's reasoning and result.
Finally, Part V analyzes one of McAteer's most disturbing implications: it
overlooks the importance of political accountability. This Note concludes by
suggesting how South Carolina can avoid the potential danger of this
implication.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 244 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See State v. Harris, 299 S.C. 157, 159, 382 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1989) (holding that
"an officer's right to act as a private citizen beyond his jurisdiction... [is] lawful if [it] could
be properly undertaken by an ordinary citizen"); 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 12 (1975).
3. 333 S.C. 615, 511 S.E.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1998).
4. Id. at 624-25, 511 S.E.2d at 84.
5. See id. at 616-25, 511 S.E.2d at 80-84.
6. See id. at617,511 S.E.2d at 80.
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If. EVOLUTION OF COMMON-LAW CITIZEN ARREST AUTHORITY
Under English common law, every individual had a duty to either
arrest or to "make [an] outcry calling the community to pursue and take" any
person committing a felony in the individual's presence.7 If the felony was not
committed in the individual's presence, the law still authorized a private person
to make a citizen's arrest if"(1) the felony was actually committed and (2) the
private person ha[d] reasonable cause to believe the one he [arrested]
committed the felony for which the arrest [was] made."8
English common law was less deferential when only misdemeanors
were involved. Under the common law, private citizens could arrest individuals
committing misdemeanors only when the misdemeanor "involved a breach of
the peace [that was] committed in the presence ofthe person making the arrest.
In addition, the arrest had to be made at the time of the offense or as soon
thereafter as possible."9 An older treatise on the laws of England elaborated:
A private person may... without
a warrant arrest anyone who in his presence
commits a breach of the peace, when the
breach is still continuing, or, if it is not still
continuing, when there is reasonable ground
for apprehending a renewal of the breach,
or when the offender escapes immediately
after committing the breach and is taken on
fresh pursuit, which commenced
immediately and is continued without a
break.
A private person may also, it
seems, arrest without a warrant anyone who
there is reasonable ground for supposing is
about to commit a breach of the peace in the
presence of such private person.
If a breach of the peace has been
committed, and there is nothing to show
that the offender intends to renew the
offence, there is no power at common law
to arrest without a warrant.
In cases of misdemeanour other
than those which amount to a breach of the
peace there is, in the absence of statutory
7. State v. Nail, 304 S.C. 332, 337,404 S.E.2d 202,206 (Ct. App. 1991).
8. Id. at 338, 404 S.E.2d at 206.
9. William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REv. 771, 774-75 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 50: 917
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authority, no power to arrest without a
warrant. 0
The United States Supreme Court has cited this English common-law principle
with approval."
The common law granted police officers the same powers of arrest as
citizens, as well as some additional powers. English common law dictated that
police officers had the authority to arrest not only "on suspicion of felony,
whether a felony ha[d] orha[d] not been committed," but also "on a reasonable
charge of felony being made to him by a private person against anyone else.""2
Most states have adopted approaches to warrantless arrests similar to
those of the English common law. 3 These approaches draw a distinction
between truly private citizens' arrests and arrests conducted by police officers:
[A police officer] is duty-bound to make an
arrest whenever there is a violation of the
law, but is limited by constitutional
requirements (particularly the Fourth
Amendment's "probable cause" and
"reasonableness"), while a citizen is not
duty-bound nor limited by the Fourth
Amendment or due process limitations...
unless the citizen is found to be acting as an
agent of the state.'4
Thus, the states, while patterning their policies after the English common law,
recognized the importance of differentiating between arrests made by persons
with official state authority and those made by purely private citizens. This
distinction is important because police officers are subject to constitutional
constraints and greater accountability.
Im. STATE v MCATEER
On February 12, 1995, police officer Randolph Thompson-was off
10. 9 THE EARL OF HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 610 (1909) (footnotes
omitted).
11. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925) (stating that an arrest for
a misdemeanor not committed in the arresting individual's presence is unlawful) (citing 9
HALSBURY, supra note 10, § 612).
12. 9 HALSBURY, supra note 10, § 611.
13. M. CHERIF BAssiouNi, CITIzEN'S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND
SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 18-19 (1977) (explaining that most states
adopted policies based on the common law as adopted in the United States, which did not require
citizens to make arrests like early English common law required).
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duty and driving his personal vehicle one-half mile outside Rock Hill's city
limits when he observed James McAteer's vehicle sitting in the road. 5 Officer
Thompson, still in uniform, got out of his vehicle and watched McAteer drive
about 250 yards and turn into a driveway. Officer Thompson, deciding to
investigate, approached McAteer's vehicle and noticed open alcohol containers
lying in the car and an odor of alcohol exuding from the vehicle. 16 Thompson
testified that he was not acting as a police officer in his official capacity at the
time, but concedes that McAteer could have been under that impression.'
Officer Thompson informed McAteer that McAteer could not leave the scene
until another police officer arrived. Trooper Suter, a South Carolina Highway
Patrolman, arrived at the scene, performed sobriety tests on McAteer, and
arrested McAteer for driving under the influence of alcohol.'"
At trial McAteer and the prosecution stipulated that McAteer was
"peacefully detained" by Officer Thompson. 9 "Such a detention constitutes a
seizure and is subject to the same protection under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments as an arrest."20 Therefore, McAteer sought suppression of all
evidence of his arrest." The trial court denied this motion, and McAteer was
convicted of driving under the influence.' McAteer appealed, and the South
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. After this decision, the full
court of appeals decided to rehear the case en banc and again upheld the
conviction.' The opinion affirming the judgement held that Officer
15. State v. McAteer, 333 S.C. 615, 617,511 S.E.2d 79,80 (Ct. App. 1998).
16. Id.
17. Officer Thompson gave the following testimony at trial:
Q [Defense Counsel]: Were you acting in your
authority as a police officer?
A [Thompson]: No, sir.
Q [Defense Counsel]: Did you leave him that
impression?
A [Thompson]: I believe so. I can't testify as to what
he believed.
Q [Defense Counsel]: Well, the average citizen, if
you walked up to them and you were a police officer
and told them you were not going to drive away, they
would assume you are acting within the scope of your
authority, would that be correct?
A [Thompson]: Yes, sir. I explained to him that he
had to wait until the York County deputy arrived.
Appellant's Brief at 9 n.5.
18. McAteer, 333 S.C. at 617, 511 S.E.2d at 80.
19. Id. at 618, 511 S.E.2d at 80.
20. Id. at 618, 511 S.E.2d at 80-81.
21. Id. at617, 511 S.E.2d at 80.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 616, 511 S.E.2d at 80. Fivejudges voted to reverse McAteer's conviction,
while four judges voted to affirm. Id. In South Carolina, during an en bane proceeding, reversal
of the lower court requires six votes, so McAteer's conviction was upheld. Id.; see S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-8-90(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) ("When the Court sits en banc, six of the judges
[Vol. 50:917
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Thompson's warrantless arrest of McAteer was valid because the common
law's authorization of citizens' arrests for misdemeanors involving breaches of
the peace had not been modified by any South Carolina statutory or case law
and, thus, was still in effect.' Furthermore, the court held that driving under the
influence of alcohol constituted a breach of the peace.' However, the court did
not comment on the civil and political accountability issues raised by Officer
Thompson's alleged use of official indicia-his police uniform and behavior
as an officer--during the arrest.
The dissent asserted that South Carolina was no longer bound by the
common-law rule granting citizens arrest authority over misdemeanors because
the state had adopted inconsistent law.26 In addition, the dissent noted that even
if the English common-law provision authorizing citizens to arrest for
misdemeanors involving breaches of the peace was still in effect, McAteer did
not commit a breach of the peace.27 However, the dissent also failed to
comment on the accountability issues raised by Thompson's acting under the
color of state authority outside his jurisdiction.
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MCATEER RESULT
The result in McAteer is desirable for a number of reasons. First,
McAteer's holding preserves the common law. Although the United States
Supreme Court has not adopted "the notion that 'the "reasonableness"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common
law afforded,"'2" it has been highly deferential towards English common law,
finding it instructive in deciding what is and what is not a reasonable search
constitute a quorum and a concurrence of six of the judges is necessary for a reversal of the
judgment below.").
24. McAteer, 333 S.C. at 623, 511 S.E.2d at 84. South Carolina's reception statute
provides: "All, and every part, of the common law of England, where it is not altered by the
Code or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of this State, is hereby continued in full force
and effect ..... S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
25. McAteer, 333 S.C. at 624, 511 S.E.2d at 84.
26. Id. at 628, 511 S.E.2d at 86 (Conner, J., dissenting); see also S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-13-10 ("Upon (a) view of a felony committed, (b) certain information that a felony has been
committed or (c) view of a larceny committed, any person may arrest the felon or thief and take
him to a judge or magistrate, to be dealt with according to law.").
The dissent also asserted that Percival v. Bailey, 70 S.C. 72, 49 S.E. 7 (1904), a case
in which a private citizen arrested an individual for disorderly conduct and turned the individual
over to the police, was inconsistent with common law because the court invalidated that arrest.
See McAteer, 333 S.C. at 634-35, 511 S.E.2d at 90. The dissent compared Percival to Loggins
v. Southern Railway, 64 S.C. 321, 42 S.E. 163 (1902), where the court found that a train
conductor's duty to arrest an unruly passenger derived from a statute rather than from the
common law. See McAteer, 333 S.C. at 636, 511 S.E.2d at 90-91.
27. McAteer, 333 S.C. at 638-39, 511 S.E.2d at 92.
28. Schroeder, supra note 9, at 8 10 (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,583
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and seizure.29 Furthermore, "[d]ecisions under the common law still provide the
basic precedents relied upon by the courts of [this] nation."3 Thus, in
preserving common-law authority, South Carolina preserves the principles of
liberty outlined in the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment's
command for reasonable searches and seizures, and follows the lead of other
courts in using English common law as a touchstone for modem decisions.
Second, a move away from common-law arrest powers is a move
"toward less protection for the individual.' In fact, a few states have
determined that eliminating the breach of peace requirement for citizens'
arrests is unconstitutional.32 Therefore, South Carolina is wise in choosing
policies which do not significantly deviate from English common-law
precedents.
A third reason the result in McAteer is desirable involves the public
safety issues surrounding drunk driving. One cannot deny the serious
consequences that can flow from driving under the influence of alcohol, and
authorizing citizens to arrest drunk drivers generates more manpower in the
fight to remove this danger from the streets. Furthermore, allowing private
individuals as well as police officers acting outside their jurisdictions to
perform such arrests helps maintain general respect for law enforcement and
confidence among law enforcement officials themselves. As one commentator
noted, "when an offense occurs in a police officer's presence and that officer
is powerless to make an arrest, the officer's inaction may generate disrespect
for the law and lead to low morale among law enforcement officers."33
Although these reasons make the result inMcAteer desirable, the result
brings disadvantages as well. It may escalate road rage. The dissent was
justifiably apprehensive about "the prospect of roaming bands of citizens
stopping each other for traffic offenses" because "allowing untrained citizens
to confront and arrest each other for violations of the traffic laws invites
anarchy and potential tragedy."3 Citizens might violently resist other private
29. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (stating that "the common
law... has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment"); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 621 (1991) (looking to common law to determine what constitutes an arrest under the
Fourth Amendment).
30. BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 27.
31. Schroe-ler, supra note 9, at 827.
32. See id. at 790.
33. Id. at 838. Schroeder stated that "requiring a warrant to arrest for all
misdemeanors that do not involve a breach of the peace, even those committed in the officer's
presence," would result in this "disrespect" and "low morale." Id.; see also WAYNER. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT rINrO CUSTODY 146 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965)
(implying that not only might an officer decline to perform an arrest if the officer would suffer
a loss of public support in conducting that arrest, but he also "might arrest a person who
ordinarily would not be arrested in order to maintain respect for the police or the law
enforcement system as a whole").
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citizens' arrest attempts, which could possibly lead to death.35 And even if
violence does not ensue, the alleged wrongdoer may still suffer damages. "Any
arrest has a profound and long-lasting effect on the arrestee," for an arrest often
leads to lost employment, suspicion, and scrutiny by police, emotional distress,
public humiliation, and severed relationships with family and friends.36
Considering the potential injuries associated with being arrested and the
damages flowing from improper arrests, both private citizens and alleged
wrongdoers are perhaps better protected if the power to arrest is left to
experienced law enforcement officers. Obviously, these officers are better
trained in apprehending wrongdoers than are ordinary private citizens.
V. MCATEER 'S GRAVESTIMPLICATION: OVERLOOKING THE IMPORTANCE
OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The most significant disadvantage of McAteer is that it overlooks the
importance of police officer accountability. McAteer confers "boundless" law
enforcement authority to police officers displaying official state authority
without providing corresponding provisions of law to guarantee accountability.
Police officers are most likely accountable to their home jurisdictions, for those
jurisdictions hire and compensate the officers.37 And police officers are simply
more visible in their home precincts. Therefore, because "foreign" arenas do
not confer the same benefits or responsibilities upon the officers, questions
arise when officers act outside their bailiwick. The officers are less "politically
accountable" to the foreign jurisdictions than to their home precincts.
Cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 19838 and those discussing the "color
35. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 50 S.C. 405, 427, 27 S.E. 905, 913 (1897) (involving a
private citizen's attempt to arrest a thief that ended with the shooting death of the man who
attempted the arrest).
36. Schroeder, supra note 9, at 797-800.
37. Cf Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on
Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503,
516 (1994) (commenting on the ability of state and local governments to better respond to local
and state concerns than the federal government).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
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of office" doctrine, though not exactly on point, are relevant to the issue of
political accountability.39 Criminal procedure cases also shed light on this
issue. For example, an Illinois court determined that police officers acting
under guise of state authority are not ordinary citizens. In People v. Seybold0
police officers acting outside their jurisdiction made an arrest after a lengthy
drug investigation.4' The court stated that, at the time of the arrest, the police
officers were acting as agents of the state, but because the police officers did
not reveal their identities as police officers at the commencement of the arrest,
the court invalidated it.42 In Goodman v. State43 a Florida court held that an
officer acting pursuant to a request for aid by a sheriff's department in making
an extrajurisdictional arrest related to a case that originated in his jurisdiction
had the authority to make the arrest.' The court did not consider the officer to
be a private citizen making a citizen's arrest.
45
As these cases evince, courts believe thatpolice officers making arrests
outside their jurisdictions, flashing some indicia of state authority, are not truly
"private" citizens and, therefore, need further accountability. As one
Id.
39. See, e.g., State v. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d 262, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
("Pursuant to the 'under color of office' doctrine, police officers acting outside theirjurisdiction
but not in fresh pursuit may not utilize the power of their office to gather evidence or ferret out
criminal activity not otherwise observable.").
40. 423 N.E.2d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
41. Metropolitan Enforcement Group made the arrest, and this group was "composed
of police officers of several municipalities located in Cook County, [Illinois.]" Id. at 1133.
42. The court stated:
Agent Kautz testified the door was closed but
unlocked and that they did not announce their identity
or purpose before entering the apartment, but did so
after getting inside. The occupants of the
apartment.. . were handcuffed and it was searched.
.. . It seems apparent in the unusual
circumstances ... that the MEG agents who entered
the apartment, arrested defendant, and seized the
evidence in issue believed at the time they were
acting as police officers and that they were, in fact,
conducting the drug investigation on behalf of the
State.
For these reasons [and others discussed in
the case,) the denial of defendant's motion to
suppress evidence will be reversed ....
Id. at 1133-35.
43. 399 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
44. Id. at 1121.
45. For a discussion of other cases involving extrajurisdictional arrests, see Russell
G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity, in State Criminal Trial, of Arrest Without Warrant by
Identified Peace Officer Outside of Jurisdiction, When Not in Fresh Pursuit, 34 A.L.R.4th 328
(1984).
8
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commentator, analogizing to federal jurisdiction, stated:
While a federal officer, in the absence of
federal statute, acting under authority of
state law, has been held to have only the
arrest authority of a private citizen, such
technical status under state law does not
affect his official position as a government
agent for purposes of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures: He is still an official for that
purpose. By analogy, the same would seem
to be true in the case of a state officer acting
outside the boundaries ofhis ownbailiwick,
in which case he also is held to occupy the
status of a private citizen.'
However, civil lawsuits, such as those based on the issues in the cases
mentioned above or on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are not the most effective
accountability check on police officers.47 Primarily, the threat of such suits
generally does not deter police officers from misconduct. "'Many officers lose
nothing as a result of being sued. It costs them nothing financially, it never
results in discipline, it has no effect on promotion, and it does not affect the
way officers are regarded by their peers and superiors.' 4 s Moreover, civil
lawsuits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide checks on civil accountability,
not professional accountability; a police officer can walk away from a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suit not legally liable for violating another person's
constitutional rights, but still be guilty of unprofessional conduct.49 Therefore,
some jurisdictions recognize the need for explicit guarantees of political
accountability whenuniformedpolice officers make extrajurisdictional arrests.
For example in Pennsylvania, the legislature has enacted a statute
establishing statewide municipal policejurisdiction.50 The statute contemplates
extrajurisdictional police authority in various circumstances. Essentially, it
46. EDWVARD C. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 80 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
47. See Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 753, 753-54 (1993).
48. Id. at 767-68 (quoting Telephone Interview with Oliver Jones, Attorney in
Oakland, Cal. (Jan. 8, 1992)).
49. See, e.g., McAnnis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(involving an extrajurisdictional arrest by an officer who, while acting merely as a citizen,
identified himself as an officer and drew a gun on the arrestee). Regardless of whether one
agrees with the McAnnis court that the officer did not implicate the "color of office" doctrine,
id. at 1232, political accountability seems a necessary check for misusing state authority and
acting unprofessionally.
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authorizes extrajurisdictional arrests in six specific instances: (1) pursuant to
a court order; (2) when "the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any
offense which was committed... within his primary jurisdiction;" (3) "to aid
or assist [another] law enforcement officer;" (4) with the other jurisdiction's
prior consent; (5) when the officer is "on official business and views an
offense, or has probable cause to believe.., a felony, misdemeanor, breach of
the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger
[has been committed];" and (6) when the officer "views an offense which is a
felony, or has probable cause to believe.., a felony has been committed."5'
This statute obviously expands police arrest authority. However, the
statute's underlying purpose is to balance this extrajurisdictional power with
intrajurisdictional checks. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated this
purpose in Commonwealth v. Merchant.52 In Merchant, the court explained that
through the Jurisdiction Act, the General Assembly expanded the powers of
local police while "maintaining police accountability to local authority."53 The
court praised the Act's objectives, noting that the Act "fosters local control
over the police, and discourages extra-territorial forays by outside law
enforcement officers who are not subject to the control of the municipality:
certainly a laudable goal."'54 New York has enacted a similar statute, conferring
police officers statewide jurisdiction.55
Other states have established review boards to investigate police
misconduct. For example, since 1885 the Milwaukee Fire and Police
Commission has overseen, among other things, allegations of police or fire
personnel misconduct.56 One commentator described civilian review as follows:
51. Id.
52. 595 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 1991).
53. Id. at 1139.
54. Id. at 1138 n.7; see also Benjamin S. Lifsey, Note, CriminalLaw -Municipal
Police Jurisdiction: Criminals CannotHideBehindMunicipalBoundaryLines--Cmmonwealth
v. Pratti, 608 A.2d 488 (Pa. 1992), 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 515, 527 (1993) (interpreting Pratti as
reiterating that the primary purpose of the statute is to "expand[] local police powers, while
maintaining local accountability and control").
55. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(3) (McKinney 1992), cited in State v.
McAteer, 333 S.C. 641,511 S.E.2d 79,93 (Ct. App. 1998) (Connor, J., dissenting). InMcAteer,
Judge Connor implied that the South Carolina General Assembly should consider a statute
patterned after New York's, not because the McAteer decision grants police officers an escape
from political accountability, but because Judge Connor thought that a statute clearly granting
police officers statewide arrest authority is the best way to guarantee police officers' authority
to make extrajurisdictional arrests without conferring such power on truly private citizens. See
McAteer, 333 S.C. at 641, 511 S.E.2d at 93 (Connor, J., dissenting). Viewing New York's statute
in relation to Pennsylvania's statute, one sees that the New York statute may not only resolve
Judge Connor's concern, butmay also offer a compromisebetween extrajurisdictional power and
intrajurisdictional control andprovide a guarantee ofpolitical accountability when officers arrest
outside their bailiwicks.
56. See Richard S. Jones, Processing Civilian Complaints: A Study of the Milwaukee
Fire and Police Commission, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 505, 512-19 (1994). The Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission is the oldest fire and police commission in the United States. Id. at 512.
Vol. 50: 917
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The defining characteristic of civilian
review is the review of police misconduct
by persons who are not sworn police
officers. Citizens who feel they are victims
of police misconduct and are not satisfied
with the way the police department handled
their complaint can bring their case before
a civilian review board.'
The Milwaukee Commissionhas established an intricate procedure to deal with
citizen complaints. The procedure commences when a citizen files a complaint
with either the Commission or the respective police department and can end
with a suspension, demotion, or discharge of the offending official.5 8 In fact,
the Commission's ability to impose punishment is what makes the Milwaukee
model so successful as compared with other civilian review boards. 9 However,
most complaints never culminate in disciplinary actions, as "[m]any times the
complaint is resolved [by] conciliation" between the officer and the
complainant.' Only when conciliation is not successful is a pretrial conference
set and a trial conducted.61
Detroit has established a different review board, the Detroit Board of
Police Commissioners (BPC), to exercise control over complaints of police
misconduct. 62 A unit within the BPC, known as the Professional Standards
Section (PSS), deals exclusively with "conducting and reviewing all complaint
investigations, maintaining complaint and injury records, and controlling the
distribution and use of a... standardized complaint form. The PSS [is] also
charged with actively seeking out instances of misconduct, mistreatment of
citizens, and inadequate or improper police service" 63 In its first year of
existence, the PSS proved that its services were much needed, for the PSS
"caseload represented a 200% increase over the cumulative total of 1, 733




While neither the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission nor
57. Id. at 505 (footnote omitted).
58. For a complete discussion of the review board procedure, see id. at 514-16.
59. "As expressed by the former Director of [the Commission], 'I think that the
biggest strength is that we have teeth in our law."' Id. at 517 (quoting Interview with Michael
Morgan, Executive Director, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, in Milwaukee, Wis. (July
21, 1992)).
60. Id. at 515.
61. Id.
62. See Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent ofPolice
Misconduct, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 5 passim (198 1).
63. Id. at 39-40 (footnotes omitted). The PSS also is "directed to recommend
innovations in the department's organization, policies, and procedures to minimize incidences
of injury to citizens resulting from police action or inaction." Id. at 40.
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Detroit's BPC was established primarily to deal with "professional"
accountability, such a concern is not inconsistent with their objectives, as the
structures of these boards imply. For example, in Detroit citizens can file
complaints asserting general demeanor infractions, implying that general
unprofessional behavior is a valid complaint.65 On the other hand, in
Milwaukee one of the Commission's stated goals is to maintain
professionalism." Furthermore, although both the Detroit and Milwaukee
models deal with the police personnel of only one city, nothing suggests that
such models could not deal with police misconduct on a statewide level,
erasing any territorial bounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently, South Carolina has neither a civilian review board nor a
statutory scheme similar to that of Pennsylvania or New York.67 In fact, South
Carolina has not enacted any statutory provision ensuring political
accountability of law enforcement officers conducting extrajurisdictional
arrests, although, admittedly, South Carolina law enforcement officers are still
held to community and professional standards when they act outside their
respective jurisdictions.
With the court's decision inMcAteer, police officers now have greater
latitude in effecting arrests as "private citizens" even though an accused
believes the arrest implicates state authority. At the same time, Officer
Thompson, having just gotten off duty, was clearly stuck in a dilemma. While
still in uniform, he witnessed a crime taking place. He clearly did not have time
to change clothes without risking both spoliation of evidence and McAteer's
escape. Yet without disrobing his official attire, Thompson risked appearing to
act under the auspice of state authority and using his authority in an
unprofessional manner.
An acceptable medium is achievable. South Carolina can adopt a
mechanism that allows police officers to conduct statewide arrests while
preserving professionalism and preventing misleading arrests. South Carolina
can achieve this compromise by adopting a statute similar to Pennsylvania's or
by creating a civilian review board that has the power to sanction officers for
unprofessional conduct. Such a solution would preserve the advantages of
McAteer while eliminating its drawbacks. Additionally, establishing statewide
jurisdiction would preserve the common law, which in turn would preserve the
65. See id. at 43.
66. See Jones, supra note 56, at 513 (stating that with the passage of the bill
establishing the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission, the Commission "'acquired the
authority... to review the efficiency and general good conduct of the departments"' (quoting
MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMM'N COMMEMORATIVE BOOKLET 6 (1985))).
67. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (authorizing
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distinction between the arrest authority of police officers and private citizens
and would preserve the Fourth Amendment as a touchstone for defining what
is and what is not a reasonable search or seizure. Furthermore, such a solution
would devote more manpower to the fight against drunk driving by allowing
police officers to arrest drunk drivers in all parts of the state. Granting police
officers this authority will generate respect for law enforcement in general and
confidence among law enforcement officials themselves.
The drawbacks of the McAteer result disappear with such a solution,
for if statewide arrest authority is given to police officers, arrests such as that
inMcAteerneed notbe upheld as citizens' arrests. Thus, the threat of "roaming
bands of citizens stopping each other for traffic offenses" subsides.68 In
addition, the potential injuries and damages resulting for improper arrests
diminish because the authority to deal with alleged wrongdoers is left in the
hands of trained officers. Furthermore, adopting one of the above solutions
would resolve the problem of maintaining the political accountability
associatedwith intrajurisdictional responsibilities whenpolice officers perform
extrajurisdictional arrests.
McAteer will most likely come before the South Carolina Supreme
Court providing an opportunity for the court to resolve the positive and
negative implications of McAteer.
Christine Fernicola
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